sale. Both activities are viewed in the law as being in restraint of trade. The provision of the contract to which objection was made read as follows:
You [the seller] agree that the prices (including any service or other charges) charged to our Cardmembers including advertised sales will not be greater than those charged to other customers.
In effect this provision forbade the granting of discounts to those customers offering to pay in cash. Retailers accepting the American Express Card as means of payment generally pay a percentage of the sales 2 price ranging from 4 1/2% to 6% of the sale price.
Consumers Union apparently believes that prices posted by retailers who accept credit cards as a means of payment are higher than would All references to the content of the suit are to the complaint as filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (plus appended Retail Store Agreement), and as supplied by Mr. Paul Gewirtz, attorney for the plaintiffs. The cooperation of Mr, Gewirtz and the Center for Law and Social Policy in supplying requested information is hereby gratefully acknowledged. 2 There is an additional charge of $25 "endorsement fee" per year for establishments generating less than $1000 in American Express credit card sales, the significance of which will be examined below. o otherwise be the case. Consumers Union wants retailers to be permitte^d to reduce the prices paid by consumers not using credit cards (specif ically, the American Express card in the case under review). Presumably, Consumers Union believes that, given the opportunity, many retailers would in fact so reduce their prices to cash-paying customers because of . . 4 competitive pressures.
The suit against American Express was intended to set a precedent, and, eventually to lead to lower prices at the retail level to cashpaying customers. In fact, the American Express Company has agreed, in an out-of-court settlement, to permit retail stores that accept its credit card to grant discounts to customers who pay cash, and so to inform all retail establishments accepting the American Express card,Â greements with other credit card companies have followed upon the American Express settlement. One could reasonably infer, then, that the set! lement between Consumers Union and American Express has served as a precedent. The suit, previously pending against American Express, has 3 As a fine legal point, one should refer to "the plaintiffs", but in this paper "Consumers Union" will be used at times when the former is what is, meant.
4
A lawyer for Consumers Union argued this very point. Cf. The Wall Street Journal, XC (April 18, 1974) .
It should perhaps be noted here that the Consumers Union is a non profit organization that articulates what it believes to be the interests of the consumer. Among other things, the organization publishes a maga zine (Consumers Union Reports). in which results of product testing of interest to consumers are presented.
That prices to cash paying customers are alleged to be higher than they would be, in the absence of the aforementioned contractual agreement between American Express and its retailers, can be seen from the follow ing allegation contained in the original suit: "Plaintiffs Blitz and Consumers Union and its members have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable injury from the practices described in...this Complaint".
Cf, the article cited in footnote 4, above.
-3 -been withdrawn by the plaintiffs as part of the settlement.
The out-of-court settlement should be of interest to the economist both as theorist and as policy adviser. Important theoretical issues are raised by this case. These Issues include the applicability of the monopoly model to cases of less than perfect information; and the ability of the nuarket to supply public goods profitably. Further, the suit against American Express has already served as a precedent in other cases, and may continue to serve as a precedent.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the issues raised by the Consumers Union suit against the American Express Company and the subse quent out-of-court settlement. The important theoretical issues raised by the suit will be examined. Specifically, the question of the effects of credit card usage on pricing will be analyzed in detail. In the course of doing so, it will be argued that an important motive for using credit cards has generally been overlooked, and that this causal factor at least mitigates the effects of credit card use on prices.
Whose Monopoly?
The ability of a firm to sell at a price above the competitive level tor above marginal cost at the current output rate] is usually taken as evidence of the existence of monopoly power at some stage in the production process. The economist is naturally interested in the source of the monopoly power. Few would argue that the retailers are the source of the monopoly power in the Armerican Express case.^Most Consumers Union apparently believes that the retailers do not possess monopoly power themselves. In their suit they assert: "But for the restrictive contract, sellers, including U.S. Shoe Retail Corporation, would be able to charge a different and lower price to cash customers than they charge to American Express card customers". The suit also speaks of the fact that: "Many of these sellers [the retailers] compete with each other in the sale of goods and services". The existence of a brand name is surely not, Ipso facto, sufficient to demonstrate the existence of monopoly power. Brand name is a method of assuring quality. With no brand names, the unsatisfied consumer would not know to whom to complain about a faulty product. In a world with no brand names, a consumer would neither know who had produced goods, nor where he had bought them (the name of the retailer being a brand name of sorts). Such a world is inconceivable, of course, because it is incon ceivable that an economy could be organized without some identification as to the source of the product (at minimum, the consumer can remember where he purchased a good), Brand names can have more or less signifi cance. The less assurance as to quality that a consumer receives from brand names, the more he must engage in search activity on his own, and supply Information as to quality himself. Brand names serve, in part at least, to lower costs of search and inspection.
If the existence of search and inspection costs helps to explain the economic service provided by brand names, then it must be acknowledged that some brand nan^s may save the consumer more or less of these informa tion costs than other brand names. The "same" physical good with one who would make use of this service. An investigation into the structure of the credit card industry would not seem to be a fruitful approach then.
It would seem then that the contention that American Express pos sesses any monopoly power that would enable it to engage in any illegal price fixing is severely undercut.
The Information Problem
Why would retailers be willing to incur the costs of accepting a credit card? This is the question that must be answered in analyzing the economics of this suit. Economic theory tells us that producers are cost-minimizers. Costs are willingly incurred as long as they result in a revenue gain, which at least compensates the producer at the margin. Retailers presumably willingly incur the costs involved in accepting credit cards because they expect thereby to capture a revenue gain that at least compensates them at the margin.
I believe that a reasonable hypothesis, which helps to explain why a retailer enters into a credit card agreement,is that he is paying for advertising. That a major part of the costs to a retailer incurred in accepting a credit card as a means of payment is for advertising can be most readily seen in the case of the so-called luxury credit cards:
American Express, Diners Club and Carte Blanche. Let us focus on the American Express card. This will be done both for the sake of concreteness in exposition, and because the suit in question was directed speci fically against the American Express Co. As with Diners Club and Carte Blanche, American Express publishes a magazine for its cardholders* Considerable space is devoted to "touting" establishments that accept the credit card in question. Moreover, most of the space in these maga zines is devoted to attempting to stimulate the cardholders* purchase of those goods that are most likely to be paid for with a credit card: 9 travel, dining out, etc.
American Express takes out full page advertisements in various national magazines, featuring and praising resorts, hotels and restau rants that accept the American Express card. In part these advertisements are seeking new cardholders. But they also appeal to current cardholders to patronize these e. tablishments and to use their American Express card to pay for the goods and services purchased at them. The ads appear in magazines whose readers apparently possess an above-average Income, and hence, a higher than average probability of being a cardholder, or being a potential candidate for an American Express card. Several of the credit card companies advertise jointly with airline companies to gen erate air travel business.
All of these activities are calculated to generate an increased demand for the products of companies that accept tfie credit card of the company doing the advertising. Advertising is, of course, a classic 9
The American Express cardholder magazine is called Travel and Leisure. In the April, 1974 issues, as an example, eight pages out of 74 were given over to plugging specific firms that accept the American Express card.
Even the name Travel and Leisure is suggestive of the "message" being given in the magazine.
The author has seen joint advertisements by American Express and several different airline companies (including United and Delta), as well as advertisements by Carte Blanche and Delta. To cite another example, Master Charge pays for billboard, magazine and television advertisements suggesting the use of that credit card as a convenient means to pay for transportation, hotel and restaurant services.
example of a public good; it is relatively costly to make those who benefit from its production contribute a proportionate share of its pro duction costs. Exclusion of non-payers is then relatively costly. Many of the practices of credit card companies seem to be directed toward circumventing the costs inherent in the private production of a public good.
The percentage charge on sales is thus seen as a method by which the credit card companies assess those who benefit most from the advertisements 12 and other services for which the credit card companies have paid.
There is at least some correlation between the use of a particular credit card (e.g., an American Express card) by a customer and the source of the information possessed by the customer about the existence of the estab lishment in question. Ceteris paribus, the more of firm's sales that are generated by the advertisements, the larger will be the fees paid to 13 the credit card conqsaiy.
On the theoretical problem of privately producing public goods, cf. Harold Derasetz, "The Private Production of a Public Good", The Journal of Law and Economics, XIII (October, 1970), 293-306. 12 I t is of course true that tliere are costs of collection involved in the use of credit cards, for which the credit card companies must charge (i.e., there are transaction costs involved in the lessening of other transaction costs). Nor is it being denied that the use of credit cards may involve the lowering of certain costs involved in the payments process.
For example, individuals traveling to places where they are not already known might find it otherwise necessary to carry large amounts of cash, because of the costs incurred by retailers in cashing their checks in such circumstances. The use of credit cards is a means of avoiding both the carrying of large amounts of cash, which presumably is costly for the wouldbe customer, and the cashing of checks drawn on individuals of dubious sta ture.
The existence of benefits of this kind are taken to be obvious. But there exist a number of other mechanisms for circumventing this particular payments difficulty: travelers checks and check-guarantee cards being two of these mechanisms. The intent of this paper is to focus on a benefit of credit cards to which little attention has been paid, and which, it is argued, is of importance for the case at hand. 13 But cf. the section below on the American Express fee structure for its retailers.
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The credit card companies do not merely provide advertising services.
To some extent they certify the quality of goods being sold by an estab lishment accepting the credit card in question. Indeed, a clause in the contract between American Express and its retailers serves to raise the cost to a retailer of giving unsatisfactory service to a cardholder; "If the Cardmember should refuse to make payment in full because of any such claim or complaint, you will reimburse us for the amount which the Cardmember refuses to pay or we may deduct this amount from subsequent payment to you."^I n the terminology adopted by Phillip Nelson, credit card companies (in this case, American Express) seem particularly prone to advertise "experience goods" (as opposed to "search goods"). Thus, the hypothesis of this paper is at least consistent with Nelson's fascinating hypothesis. Cf, Phillip Nelson, "Advertising as Information", Journal of Political Economy. 82 (July/August, 1974), 729-54. genuine information problem. The consumer desires information about pro ducts and is willing to pay for this information. The retailer is willing to pay for low cost advertising to supply this information. The credit card company is willing to supply the advertising in which the desired Information is conveyed, to the mutual benefit of all.
For cash-paying customers, the retailer has had to produce desired information himself. Thus, this hypothesis not only explains why retail ers are willing to pay a fee to the credit card companies, but suggests that discounts for cash may be less widespread than is presently supposed, once the new decision has been fully adjusted to. There are not quanti tatively different costs in obtaining cash-paying and credit card-paying customers.
The cost have merely been borne initially by different has an incentive to offer a co-'-ert cash discount to an American Express cardholder, who, ex hypothesis was attracted to that retailer by an advertisement for which the retailer did not pay. Thus, while^general it is not true that it is any cheaper to serve cash customers, in this case it is, precisely because the public good--advertising--has been produced already, and the retailer can "free ride" on its effects. One can assume the claust in the contract prevented this happening in very many cases. Again, this is the case where a retailer receives the benefit of an American Express advertisement (in the form of a customer he would not otherwise have) but avoids paying for it by negotiating a cash sale instead.
-12 -have seen, be compensated for performing its middleman function, and would be compelled to curtail its advertising. In this case, a cut-back in advertising services provided by American Express (and other credit card companies, as they settle) would be a predictable result of the out-ofcourt settlement. If, as is reasonable to assume, the credit card com panies were low cost producers of advertising services up to the quantity they supplied, then, on the face of it, an allocational inefficiency would result.
The author would be the last to suggest that the supply of informa tion about goods that is produced in this fashion is the same as would be produced in the construct of perfect competition in which information is costless to obtain. There are a number of obvious problems with the present system. Cardholders, having learned of a product from a credit card company, may pay with another instrument (i.e., a check or different credit card). Non-cardholders may discover a firm or product because of an advertisement by a credit card company, and purchase the product or 18 patronize the firm without using the credit card in question. In the first case, a f:.rm makes a sale as the result of information supplied by the credit card company, but does not pay for the cost of producing the information. Other things equal, this kind of situation would increase as retailers make cash discounts. In the second case, the effects are similar, though the settlement has no immediate impact on this class of freeriders.
If the credit card companies cannot prevent retailers from granting cash discounts, then a remarkably ingenious method for the private 18 Significantly, the credit card companies make no apparent attempt to obtain subscribers to their magazines among non-cardholders. Part of the demand by credit card-paying customers for the products of a particular firm may be the result of this general advertising. Another part of the demand for the firm's products is due to the firm-specific advertising, which this paper has focused on. There is no way for the firm to separate out the source of credit card customers' demand between general and specific advertising. Nor would there be any reason for the firm to do so. The results are the same, and the general advertising being equally a public good, the costs of producing it must be appor tioned among the users of the good according to their relative intensity of demand for that good. This method of billing would probably be a computational nightmare for the credit card companies, though it has been suggested to me that it is essentially the billing method followed by telephone companies.
That is, the rate varies depending on where one purchases the services (in state, out of state, etc.). Of course, the number of possible establishn^nts at which the American Express card could be used far exceeds, for instance, the number of long distance calling "zones" in the continental U.S. (there being but four such zones). Even if this alter native method of billing could be instituted, it would presumably be nwre costly than the current billing methods, which are universal and thus presumably present some cost advantage. How far the assumed cost disad vantage of the new system would affect allocation would depend on its magnitude. The new, hypothesized billing method, wherein the customer is assessed for each charge and at differential rates, would surely meet with customer resistence. It would prove difficult to explain to a customer why he must pay more for a charge at one establishment than at another.
It is true that the phone company does this very thing, but it presents such a small problem to it precisely because it has an enforced monopoly.
Further, if the hypothetical fee structure were adopted, someone would surely suggest price discrimination were being practiced. And, again, in the absence of a legal monopoly such as is possessed by the telephone companies, few companies would be likely to incur the sanctions of the anti-trust laws to Institute a new billing mechanism.
More to the point, however, the existence of an explicit charge to 21 the cardholder would provide an incentive to pay cash. The incentive would be greater the greater the explicit charge. As the charges to the cardholder would vary, ex hvpothesi. with the advertising services pro vided by the credit card company to the retailer, the incentive to "cheat" (i.e., to negotiate a cash sale) would be greatest where the credit card company's costs in generating the aforementioned sale had been greatest.
All things considered, then, this would appear to be a most unsatisfactory alternative to the current billing mechanism.
In general this is not a paper in marketing, and hence is not intended to suggest how^n fact American Express will adjust, but only that costly adjustmeit may be called for. Some cheating will undoubtedly occur (the author ha.J heard of cases already). This cheating will have a deleterious effect on the private provision of the public good in question. Any known alternative method of organizing payment for adver tising services will not be cheaper, or it would already have been adopted.
It could very well be considerably niore expensive.
To sum up, then,^best the suit would seem to be pointless, because Another factor relevant here is whether the "lesser" credit card companies exclude retailers to the extent the "luxury" credit card com panies have been assumed to do. That is, is the brand name of Master Charge as important as that of American Express? It would appear that it is not, but this is more of a guess than a reasoned conclusion. difficult to explain this behavior as rational, unless one were to main tain that American Express has a monopoly over the means of payment.
But the argument of this paper suggests that proportionally more adver tising and other services are provided by the luxury credit card companies, and their fees are consequently higher.
Implications
It has been argued that credit card companies provide advertising and "brand name" services, which generally reduce search and information costs for customer and retailer alike, l/hereas other hypotheses for the use of credit cards focus almost solely <'n the iiKDtivation of the customer in using a credit card, this paper has suggested that one must also explain the motivation of the retailer In accepting credit cards. More over, it has been argued that there are benefits in the use of credit cards that do not result from the use of certain instruments (e.g., travelers checks) that also provide services that admittedly are provided by credit cards. Attention has been focused on the services broadly labelled "advertising", because they have been generally neglected.
The legal settlement in question has only occurred comparatively recently. The effects, if any, would not be expected to be particularly visible yet, as adjustment to a change takes time. One implication of this paper is that the widespread granting cash discounts will not be a longrun response by retailers. Surely the future will provide opportunities for observing the changes wrought by this settlement.
Above all else economics teaches the interdependence of economic action, and the fact that a change in one part of the economy has perva sive effects, not apparent to the untrained (which here includes lawyers and jurists). It is not that economists can see all the effects, but -21 -their theory enables them to perceive possibilities that would not be thought of by those untrained in economics. Indeed, one might say that economics teaches one to examine the unseen consequences of an action.
Economics also teaches one to examine in detail allegations such as the one being examined here, viz, that American Express has been engaging in behavior that is economically (as opposed to legally) that of a monopoi^l ist. The analysis presented here casts doubt on this particular allega tion. The most general conclusion that could be drawn is that our monopoly laws may permit the suppression of competitive behavior. This conclusion would not, of course, stand in contradiction to any claim that other monopolistic practices are being pormitted or facilitated by existing laws on monopoly and monopolization. But that is a subject for a different paper. 
